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1.
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The New Structure for Technology Leakage Investigations
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(1)
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Technology Leakage Offenses Are Now Expressly Within the SCIA’s Jurisdiction
Article 2, Subparagraph 1, Item (e) of the current SCIA Act designates as “serious crimes” the offenses under Articles 36, 36-2, 37, and 38 of the Act on Prevention of Divulgence and Protection of Industrial Technology (the “Industrial Technology Protection Act”), and the offenses under Articles 18, 18-2, 18-3, and 18-4 of the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act (the “Unfair Competition Prevention Act”). Moreover, violations of the Defense Industry Technology Protection Act and the Military Secret Protection Act (Item (d) of the same subparagraph), as well as offenses under Chapter XL of the Criminal Act (embezzlement and breach of trust) (Item (a) of the same subparagraph), are likewise “serious crimes.” Accordingly, offenses such as occupational breach of trust, which are commonly charged together with technology leakage offenses, also fall within the SCIA’s investigative scope. Criminal proceeds concealment offenses connected to such “serious crimes” (Item (f) of the same subparagraph) and offenses directly related to a “serious crime” (Subparagraph 2, Item (d)) are within the SCIA’s jurisdiction as well.
As originally enacted, Item (e) qualified technology leakage offenses with the phrase “cybercrimes constituting an attack on national core infrastructure.” That language gave rise to the interpretation that typical technology leakage scenarios involving no network intrusion—such as the recruitment of inside employees or a departing employee’s taking of storage media—fell outside the SCIA’s jurisdiction, creating uncertainty as to which agency was competent. The September 29, 2026 amendment to the SCIA Act revised the statutory wording so that the national core infrastructure requirement applies only to violations of the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc., thereby resolving this uncertainty legislatively.
Under the Organizational Decree of the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency and Its Affiliated Agencies (MOIS Ordinance No. 643), the Cyber Technology Investigation Division of the Scientific Investigation Bureau at SCIA headquarters directs and supervises the regional offices and provides investigative support on industrial technology and trade secret offenses, while the Digital Investigation Division supports electronic evidence and digital forensics. At the regional level, technology leakage cases are handled by the Defense Procurement and Industrial Technology Investigation Division of the Advanced Technology Investigation Bureau of the Seoul Regional SCIA (large-scale industrial technology and defense industry cases in the Seoul metropolitan area), the Defense Procurement and Industrial Technology Investigation Division of the Suwon Regional SCIA (cases arising in the advanced-industry cluster of southern Gyeonggi Province), and the Industrial Technology Investigation Division of the Daejeon Regional SCIA (industrial technology cases in the central region).
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(2)
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A Multi-Agency Structure in Which the SCIA, the National Police, and the MOIP Special Judicial Police Coexist
The fact that a case falls within the SCIA’s investigative jurisdiction does not mean that the SCIA investigates it exclusively; the existing authority of the National Police and the MOIP Special Judicial Police is preserved. The offenses each agency may currently investigate are as follows:
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| Agency |
Offenses Subject to Investigation |
| SCIA |
Violations of the Industrial Technology Protection Act, the Unfair Competition Prevention Act (trade secrets), and the Defense Industry Technology Protection Act; and occupational breach of trust, among others |
| National Police |
The full range of technology leakage offenses, including violations of the Industrial Technology Protection Act, the Unfair Competition Prevention Act, and the Criminal Act |
| MOIP Special Judicial Police |
Among technology leakage offenses, limited to trade secret infringement offenses under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act (an amendment is being pursued to allow investigation of industrial technology infringement offenses under the Industrial Technology Protection Act as well) |
Separately, recent press reports indicate that the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy is considering operating its own special judicial police unit. No specific details have been announced, and the matter bears watching.
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(3)
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The National Police and the MOIP Have Expanded Their Technology Leakage Investigative Organizations and Staffing
On August 20, 2026, the National Security Investigation Bureau of the National Office of Investigation within the Korean National Police Agency announced a plan to add 79 personnel dedicated to technology leakage matters. Under the plan, the dedicated investigation squads at the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency and the Gyeonggi Nambu Provincial Police Agency—where cases are concentrated—will each increase from one to two, and dedicated teams will be designated by technology field in order to strengthen the response to large-scale and complex cases.
Pursuant to its “Plan to Expand and Reorganize the Response System for Technology Leakage and Misappropriation,” the MOIP established a new Technology Leakage Special Judicial Police Division effective June 30, 2026, staffing it with 21 dedicated investigators in fields such as electrical engineering, chemistry, and mechanical engineering and tasking it specifically with investigating the leakage of advanced technologies, such as companies’ trade secrets. The MOIP’s technology leakage enforcement organization has grown from one division to four, and its staffing from 27 to 61.
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(4)
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Notification and Transfer Mechanisms May Result in a Change of the Investigating Agency
Other investigative agencies must notify the Commissioner of the SCIA immediately upon recognizing a serious crime (Article 43(2) of the SCIA Act), and if the SCIA determines that direct investigation by the SCIA is appropriate and requests a transfer, the other agency must comply absent justifiable grounds (Article 43(3) of the SCIA Act). Conversely, the SCIA may transfer a case to another investigative agency where, in light of the suspect, the victim, and the nature and scale of the case, investigation by that agency is appropriate (Article 43(4) of the SCIA Act). The appropriateness of a transfer is assessed by reference to (i) the gravity of the case, (ii) the progress and duration of the investigation, (iii) whether there is controversy over fairness, and (iv) whether the statute of limitations is close to expiring (Article 20 of the Enforcement Decree of the SCIA Act).
The amended Criminal Procedure Act also permits the establishment of an Investigative Jurisdiction Coordination Council among investigative agencies for consultation on and coordination of investigative jurisdiction. It is expected that standards and methods for coordinating investigative authority among the SCIA, the National Police, and the MOIP Special Judicial Police may be established going forward.
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(5)
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The PPS Is Expected to Focus on Charging Decisions and on Maintaining the Charges, with Adversarial Argument Expected in the Course of Fact Verification
The PPS’s role is, in principle, limited to deciding whether to bring charges and to maintaining the charges. To that end, however, Article 245-13 of the Criminal Procedure Act permits it to verify the facts by hearing from the suspect, case-related parties, experts, or judicial police officers, or by receiving written opinions and related materials. Patent technology hearings and industrial technology hearings are expected to be used actively in that process. In the past, the PO played a substantive role in building the case through supplemental investigations and additional investigations initiated upon discovering further offenses; going forward, however, adversarial argument resembling a preliminary phase of the criminal trial is expected to unfold before the PPS.
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