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Changes to the Investigation Framework for Technology Leakage Cases Following the Launch of the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency, and How Companies Should Respond

2026.10.21

On October 2, 2026, the Prosecutors’ Office (the “PO”) was divided into the Public Prosecution Service (the “PPS”), under the Ministry of Justice, and the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency (the “SCIA”), under the Ministry of the Interior and Safety (the “MOIS”), inaugurating a new criminal justice framework in which investigation and prosecution are entrusted to separate institutions (Amendment to the Government Organization Act, Act No. 21491). On the same day, the Public Prosecution Service Act (Act No. 21991) and the Act on the Organization and Operation of the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency (Act No. 22016; the “SCIA Act”) took effect, as did the amended Criminal Procedure Act (Act No. 22009), which abolished prosecutors’ direct investigative authority and vested investigative authority solely in judicial police officers.
 
Immediately before the SCIA’s launch, the SCIA Act was amended (Act No. 22016) on September 29, 2026, to amend the statutory language that had confined technology leakage offenses to “cybercrimes constituting an attack on national core infrastructure,” thereby making clear that trade secret infringement and industrial technology leakage offenses, as a general matter, fall within the SCIA’s investigative jurisdiction. That said, the investigative authority of the National Police and of the Special Judicial Police of the Ministry of Intellectual Property (the “MOIP”) remains intact. As a result, technology leakage cases are now handled under a multi-agency structure in which three investigative agencies coexist. For technology leakage cases, which involve technically complex facts and depend heavily on digital evidence, this restructuring also calls for substantial changes in how victim companies respond. We summarize below the principal changes and the practical considerations they raise.
 

[Summary of Key Changes]

Item Prior Framework On and After October 2, 2026
Investigative authority PO; National Police; MOIP Special Judicial Police SCIA; National Police; MOIP Special Judicial Police
Charging authority PO PPS
Prosecutors’ investigative powers Direct investigation; supplemental investigation; investigation of additional offenses discovered in the course of review Requests for supplemental investigation
Offenses within the SCIA’s investigative jurisdiction - Violations of the Industrial Technology Protection Act, the Unfair Competition Prevention Act (trade secrets), and the Defense Industry Technology Protection Act; and occupational breach of trust, among others
Inter-agency relations - Duty of other investigative agencies to notify the Commissioner of the SCIA upon recognizing a serious crime; and the SCIA’s authority to request transfer of a case and to transfer cases to other agencies

 

1.

The New Structure for Technology Leakage Investigations

(1)

Technology Leakage Offenses Are Now Expressly Within the SCIA’s Jurisdiction

Article 2, Subparagraph 1, Item (e) of the current SCIA Act designates as “serious crimes” the offenses under Articles 36, 36-2, 37, and 38 of the Act on Prevention of Divulgence and Protection of Industrial Technology (the “Industrial Technology Protection Act”), and the offenses under Articles 18, 18-2, 18-3, and 18-4 of the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act (the “Unfair Competition Prevention Act”). Moreover, violations of the Defense Industry Technology Protection Act and the Military Secret Protection Act (Item (d) of the same subparagraph), as well as offenses under Chapter XL of the Criminal Act (embezzlement and breach of trust) (Item (a) of the same subparagraph), are likewise “serious crimes.” Accordingly, offenses such as occupational breach of trust, which are commonly charged together with technology leakage offenses, also fall within the SCIA’s investigative scope. Criminal proceeds concealment offenses connected to such “serious crimes” (Item (f) of the same subparagraph) and offenses directly related to a “serious crime” (Subparagraph 2, Item (d)) are within the SCIA’s jurisdiction as well.
 
As originally enacted, Item (e) qualified technology leakage offenses with the phrase “cybercrimes constituting an attack on national core infrastructure.” That language gave rise to the interpretation that typical technology leakage scenarios involving no network intrusion—such as the recruitment of inside employees or a departing employee’s taking of storage media—fell outside the SCIA’s jurisdiction, creating uncertainty as to which agency was competent. The September 29, 2026 amendment to the SCIA Act revised the statutory wording so that the national core infrastructure requirement applies only to violations of the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc., thereby resolving this uncertainty legislatively.
 
Under the Organizational Decree of the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency and Its Affiliated Agencies (MOIS Ordinance No. 643), the Cyber Technology Investigation Division of the Scientific Investigation Bureau at SCIA headquarters directs and supervises the regional offices and provides investigative support on industrial technology and trade secret offenses, while the Digital Investigation Division supports electronic evidence and digital forensics. At the regional level, technology leakage cases are handled by the Defense Procurement and Industrial Technology Investigation Division of the Advanced Technology Investigation Bureau of the Seoul Regional SCIA (large-scale industrial technology and defense industry cases in the Seoul metropolitan area), the Defense Procurement and Industrial Technology Investigation Division of the Suwon Regional SCIA (cases arising in the advanced-industry cluster of southern Gyeonggi Province), and the Industrial Technology Investigation Division of the Daejeon Regional SCIA (industrial technology cases in the central region).

(2)

A Multi-Agency Structure in Which the SCIA, the National Police, and the MOIP Special Judicial Police Coexist

The fact that a case falls within the SCIA’s investigative jurisdiction does not mean that the SCIA investigates it exclusively; the existing authority of the National Police and the MOIP Special Judicial Police is preserved. The offenses each agency may currently investigate are as follows:

Agency Offenses Subject to Investigation
SCIA Violations of the Industrial Technology Protection Act, the Unfair Competition Prevention Act (trade secrets), and the Defense Industry Technology Protection Act; and occupational breach of trust, among others
National Police The full range of technology leakage offenses, including violations of the Industrial Technology Protection Act, the Unfair Competition Prevention Act, and the Criminal Act
MOIP Special Judicial Police Among technology leakage offenses, limited to trade secret infringement offenses under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act (an amendment is being pursued to allow investigation of industrial technology infringement offenses under the Industrial Technology Protection Act as well)

Separately, recent press reports indicate that the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy is considering operating its own special judicial police unit. No specific details have been announced, and the matter bears watching.
 

(3)

The National Police and the MOIP Have Expanded Their Technology Leakage Investigative Organizations and Staffing

On August 20, 2026, the National Security Investigation Bureau of the National Office of Investigation within the Korean National Police Agency announced a plan to add 79 personnel dedicated to technology leakage matters. Under the plan, the dedicated investigation squads at the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency and the Gyeonggi Nambu Provincial Police Agency—where cases are concentrated—will each increase from one to two, and dedicated teams will be designated by technology field in order to strengthen the response to large-scale and complex cases.
 
Pursuant to its “Plan to Expand and Reorganize the Response System for Technology Leakage and Misappropriation,” the MOIP established a new Technology Leakage Special Judicial Police Division effective June 30, 2026, staffing it with 21 dedicated investigators in fields such as electrical engineering, chemistry, and mechanical engineering and tasking it specifically with investigating the leakage of advanced technologies, such as companies’ trade secrets. The MOIP’s technology leakage enforcement organization has grown from one division to four, and its staffing from 27 to 61.

 

(4)

Notification and Transfer Mechanisms May Result in a Change of the Investigating Agency

Other investigative agencies must notify the Commissioner of the SCIA immediately upon recognizing a serious crime (Article 43(2) of the SCIA Act), and if the SCIA determines that direct investigation by the SCIA is appropriate and requests a transfer, the other agency must comply absent justifiable grounds (Article 43(3) of the SCIA Act). Conversely, the SCIA may transfer a case to another investigative agency where, in light of the suspect, the victim, and the nature and scale of the case, investigation by that agency is appropriate (Article 43(4) of the SCIA Act). The appropriateness of a transfer is assessed by reference to (i) the gravity of the case, (ii) the progress and duration of the investigation, (iii) whether there is controversy over fairness, and (iv) whether the statute of limitations is close to expiring (Article 20 of the Enforcement Decree of the SCIA Act).
 
The amended Criminal Procedure Act also permits the establishment of an Investigative Jurisdiction Coordination Council among investigative agencies for consultation on and coordination of investigative jurisdiction. It is expected that standards and methods for coordinating investigative authority among the SCIA, the National Police, and the MOIP Special Judicial Police may be established going forward.

 

(5)

The PPS Is Expected to Focus on Charging Decisions and on Maintaining the Charges, with Adversarial Argument Expected in the Course of Fact Verification

The PPS’s role is, in principle, limited to deciding whether to bring charges and to maintaining the charges. To that end, however, Article 245-13 of the Criminal Procedure Act permits it to verify the facts by hearing from the suspect, case-related parties, experts, or judicial police officers, or by receiving written opinions and related materials. Patent technology hearings and industrial technology hearings are expected to be used actively in that process. In the past, the PO played a substantive role in building the case through supplemental investigations and additional investigations initiated upon discovering further offenses; going forward, however, adversarial argument resembling a preliminary phase of the criminal trial is expected to unfold before the PPS.

 

2.

Practical Considerations for Businesses

Under the new framework, direct and supplemental investigation by prosecutors has been eliminated, multiple investigative agencies coexist, and cases may be transferred among them. The outcome of a technology leakage case will therefore depend heavily on how a company responds at each stage—from pre-complaint preparation through investigation, transfer, and the charging decision. The following are key considerations to keep in mind.
 

First, the Investigative Record Will Drive the Outcome, So Evidence Must Be Prepared Systematically
Under the new framework, the technical facts and investigative record developed at the investigative agency stage will form the core basis for the PPS’s charging decision. In other words, the focus and quality of the materials submitted to the investigative agency will largely shape the course of the investigation and whether charges are brought.
 
Second, the Investigative Agency Suited to the Nature of the Matter Should Be Strategically Selected
Because the agencies differ in their characteristics and areas of expertise, the choice of where to file a criminal complaint can materially affect the outcome. Cases may also be transferred among agencies after a complaint is filed for various reasons. It is therefore important to establish a strategy that takes jurisdictional issues into account from the outset.
 
Third, Stage-by-Stage Advocacy Directed at Both the Investigative Agency and the PPS Is Necessary
With multiple investigative agencies now involved and the PPS concentrating on the charging decision, both the audience and the method of advocacy have changed. At the investigative stage, the company must explain to the assigned investigator, in terms that are persuasive both legally and technically, why the information qualifies as a trade secret and how it was misappropriated. Once the case is referred, final charging authority rests with the prosecutor at the PPS, it is necessary to respond appropriately to requests for supplemental investigation and the like, and organize the issues revealed in the record to persuade the prosecutor that an indictment is warranted. Ultimately, a single, coherent line of advocacy that carries through from the investigative stage to the PPS stage will determine the outcome of the case.
 
Fourth, the Handling Agency and Procedural Stage of Currently Pending Matters Should Be Checked Immediately
For cases that were pending with the PO before the reform, the handling agency may change. As a rule, the PPS may continue investigating only those cases in which the statute of limitations is imminent or continued investigation is unavoidable given the nature of the case, and then only for up to 90 days from October 2, 2026. Other cases may be transferred to the competent investigative agency: as a rule, to the police for cases referred by the police, and to the SCIA or another competent investigative agency for cases in which the PO initiated the investigation. Accordingly, companies should promptly confirm which agency is handling their case and at what stage it stands. Where the handling agency changes, it is necessary to re-explain the issues and the evidence to the new investigative agency and manage the handoff so that the investigation is neither delayed nor interrupted.

The new investigation framework heightens the importance of victim companies’ initial response strategy and evidentiary preparation. Selecting the investigative agency best suited to the matter, and advocating in stages before both the investigative agency and the prosecutor at the PPS, will likewise bear directly on the outcome. The new framework remains in its early days: the allocation of roles among agencies, the practice surrounding transfers, and the PPS’s role will take shape as practice develops. It will be important to continue refining response strategies while monitoring these operational developments.
 

[Korean Version]

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