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Response Strategies for Listed Companies Following Implementation of Dual-Listing Guidelines

2026.10.19

The amended listing rules of the Korea Exchange (the “KRX”) for the KOSPI and KOSDAQ markets, together with the related enforcement rules (collectively, the “Listing Rules”), which set forth the principle of “prohibition of dual-listings, with exceptions permitted,” took effect on August 3, 2026. Under the Listing Rules, where an unlisted company (the “subsidiary”) that is substantially controlled by a listed company (the “parent company”) is listed on a domestic or overseas securities market, five key obligations are imposed on the parent company’s board of directors, and strengthened special review criteria for dual-listings apply to the subsidiary.

Under the previous listing rules, only a broad and abstract review standard—namely, that efforts to protect shareholders must be faithfully carried out—applied in cases of listing following a spin-off. Going forward, however, regardless of how the parent-subsidiary relationship was established, dual-listings will generally be subject to both (i) procedural obligations of the parent company’s board of directors, and (ii) review standards applicable to the subsidiary, including business and management independence, investor protection and related factors. This can be understood as the introduction of a so-called “prohibition in principle, with exceptions permitted” framework, under which dual-listings are not outright banned, but are permitted only exceptionally when stringent review standards are satisfied, including the implementation of sufficient safeguards to protect general shareholders’ interests. That said, because each company’s circumstances differ, the KRX’s position is that reviews will be conducted on a case-by-case basis rather than through quantitative or uniform criteria, and that the guidelines will be continuously supplemented and made public based on actual review cases and related examples.
 

1.

Scope of Dual-Listing Regulations

A dual-listing refers to the listing of a subsidiary that is substantially controlled by a parent company. Under the amended Listing Rules, the companies subject to the dual-listing regulations are as follows:
 

Classification

Detail

Target Subsidiaries

(i)

Subsidiaries under the External Audit Act (i.e., entities subject to preparation of consolidated financial statements);

(ii)

Affiliates under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act that are in a vertical control relationship (i.e., affiliates in which the parent company owns at least 20% of the shares, as well as grand-subsidiaries and great-grand-subsidiaries in which such affiliates in turn own more than 50% of the shares); and

(iii)

Companies that fell under items (i) or (ii) mentioned above within the past year (to prevent circumvention of the regulations through shareholding adjustments immediately before listing).

Scope of Application

(i)

New listings on the KOSPI or KOSDAQ markets;

(ii)

Parent-subsidiary relationships formed through acquisitions, incorporations or similar transactions;

(iii)

Backdoor listings through mergers with listed companies, including special purpose acquisition company (“SPAC”) mergers; and

(iv)

Listings of subsidiaries on overseas securities markets.

Exclusions

(i)

Listings of entities newly established through a simple spin-off;

(ii)

Cases where the parent company is listed after the subsidiary has already been listed;

(iii)

Cases where a parent company listed on an overseas securities market lists its subsidiary in Korea; and

(iv)

Listings on the KONEX market.

(However, even in the above-mentioned cases, the common qualitative listing standards applicable to general listings, including business continuity, management transparency and investor protection, will still apply.)

 

In particular, the Listing Rules now provide that, where the listing of equity securities of an unlisted company results from a merger between a common stock-listed company and an unlisted company, or from a comprehensive share exchange, such that the transaction constitutes a dual-listing, and the KRX determines that the unlisted company is required to undergo preliminary listing review for the realization of the public interest and the protection of investors, such transaction may be treated as a backdoor listing.

Accordingly, whereas backdoor listings were previously recognized only where the transaction had the effect of a change of control, under the Listing Rules, a transaction that constitutes a dual-listing will now be treated as a backdoor listing and, as such, must undergo preliminary listing review, even if it does not have the effect of a change of control. In such cases, both the backdoor listing review requirements and the special review criteria for dual-listings under the Listing Rules will apply. However, the KRX retains discretion to determine whether a dual-listing without a change of control effect constitutes a backdoor listing.
 

2.

Five Key Obligations of Parent Company’s Board and Review by Special Committee

The Listing Rules and the “Dual-Listing Guidelines” announced by the Financial Services Commission on July 6, 2026 (the “Guidelines”) newly established the following five key obligations that the parent company’s board of directors must fulfill when pursuing the listing of a subsidiary. These obligations apply equally where the subsidiary is to be listed on an overseas exchange.
 

Obligation

Detail

Shareholder Impact Assessment

The board shall prepare and adopt a shareholder impact assessment report on the effect of the subsidiary’s listing on the parent company’s shareholders.

Shareholder Protection Measures

The board shall establish and approve specific and feasible plans, including cash dividends and the cancellation of treasury shares, the distribution of subsidiary shares (such as in-kind dividends of subsidiary shares), measures to enhance the parent company’s value through new business investments, and a commitment not to undertake additional spin-offs or subsidiary listings for a certain period.

Shareholder Communication (or Shareholder Consent Vote)

The board shall gather opinions through investor relations (“IR”) meetings or similar channels, disclose the results and whether such feedback has been reflected, or confirm whether shareholder consent has been obtained through a general meeting of shareholders or other means.

Final Resolution and Notice

The board shall adopt a final resolution approving or rejecting the listing after comprehensively considering the results of the shareholder impact assessment, shareholder protection measures and the results of shareholder communication and consent, and shall notify the subsidiary of the outcome.

Disclosure

The board shall disclose, at each stage, the fulfillment of its obligations (including, if shareholder consent confirmation has not been conducted, the reasons therefor).

 

To ensure the fair implementation of these obligations, the parent company must obtain the prior review and approval of an independent special committee within the board before adopting resolutions on the shareholder impact assessment, protection measures and the final approval or rejection of the listing. The special committee must: (i) consist of at least three members, who are either directors or outside experts who meet the qualification requirements under Article 542-8 (2) of the Commercial Code, (ii) be chaired by an independent director, with independent directors and outside experts constituting at least two-thirds of its members, and (iii) be entitled to receive assistance from independent experts at the company’s expense.

Even when a subsidiary is listed on an overseas exchange, the parent company must comply with the same five key obligations and disclosure requirements. In addition, in the case of an overseas public offering, if a securities registration statement is required to be filed with the Financial Supervisory Service pursuant to the resale criteria under the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act, the registration statement must fully describe the board of directors’ compliance with the obligations under the dual-listing regulations, as well as the shareholder protection measures adopted.
 

3.

Procedures for Implementation and Sanctions for Violations

The Guidelines set out the procedure for fulfilling obligations related to dual-listings in the following four steps. In principle, the preliminary listing review application must be filed only after completing steps A through C below. However, subject to consultation with the KRX, these steps may also be carried out in parallel following the submission of the review application.
 

A.

Prepare a shareholder impact assessment and shareholder protection measures, and disclose them after review and approval by the special committee and a resolution by the board of directors.
 

B.

Communicate with shareholders or confirm whether shareholder consent has been obtained (and, if necessary, resolve and disclose any revisions to the protection measures).
 

C.

Following the special committee’s review, the board of directors shall adopt a final resolution to approve or reject the listing, notify the subsidiary and jointly disclose the results of shareholder communication/consent and the final protection measures.
 

D.

File an application for preliminary listing review.
 

If a parent company lists a subsidiary without fulfilling its shareholder-protection obligations under the Listing Rules, a penalty for breach of the listing contract, of up to KRW 1 billion, may be imposed following review by the Listing Disclosure Committee. In addition, the company may be subject to a one-day trading suspension and sanctions for unfaithful disclosure, and if penalty points from such sanctions accumulate, they may constitute grounds for a substantive delisting review. Companies should therefore exercise caution in this regard.
 

4.

Special Review Criteria for Dual-Listings

If the dual-listing regulations apply, the preliminary listing review requested by the subsidiary will be subject, in addition to the general listing standards (formal requirements and common qualitative review criteria), to the special review criteria for dual-listings, and final approval may be granted only if both criteria are satisfied.

The special review criteria for dual-listings consist of two elements: the subsidiary’s business and management independence, and the parent company’s investor protection. The specific details are as follows.
 

Criteria

Detail

Operational Independence

(i)

Business similarity: Whether the subsidiary’s main products/services, markets/customers, business model, etc., overlap with or are similar to those of the parent company.

(ii)

Business independence: Whether the subsidiary has its own capabilities, such as market research, R&D, design/planning for its products, and whether it conducts independent price negotiations and sales activities.

(iii)

Business dependence: Whether the subsidiary depends on the parent company for major business activities such as R&D, procurement/manufacturing and sales (provided, however, that independence may still be recognized where vertical integration is unavoidable or where business efficiency, such as cost reduction or supply stability, is achieved through intra-group transactions).

Managerial Independence

(i)

Independent management: The independence of the board of directors and audit committee, and whether key executives such as the CEO and CFO are full-time and exercise substantive management authority.

(ii)

Independent management organization: Whether an independent HR and management system has been established, and whether officers and employees of the parent company concurrently hold positions at the subsidiary or there is an exchange of human resources between the parent company and subsidiary.

(iii)

Independent decision-making: Whether major management matters, such as production, sales, investment and financing, are substantially deliberated and resolved by the board of directors or equivalent body of the subsidiary.

Investor Protection

(i)

Whether the parent company’s board has fully carried out its five key obligations and passed a resolution in favor of pursuing the listing.

(ii)

Whether shareholder-protection efforts commensurate with the need to protect general shareholders (shareholders excluding the largest shareholder and related parties) have been implemented.

Shareholder Consent

In the case of a subsidiary created through a spin-off in kind, shareholder consent is mandatory. For ordinary subsidiaries, if shareholder consent is obtained, the shareholder-protection efforts are presumed to have been satisfied (with the voting rights of the largest shareholder, etc., limited to 3% in resolutions adopted at the general meeting of shareholders for purposes of obtaining shareholder consent).

 

However, in the case of a “low-weight subsidiary”—where the subsidiary’s ratios of sales, operating profit and assets to those of the parent company are all less than 10%—the review of whether shareholder-protection measures have been implemented may be exempted, provided that the procedural obligations have been fulfilled. By contrast, for “ordinary subsidiaries” that undergo individual review because shareholder consent was not obtained, a strict examination is conducted, comprehensively taking into account factors such as the necessity of listing separately from the parent company, the applicant’s industry characteristics (including whether it falls within a high-tech industry), the background and duration of the parent-subsidiary relationship, the parent company’s contribution to the subsidiary, the subsidiary’s significance within the parent company, and the potential for conflicts of interest between controlling and general shareholders.
 

With the introduction of the Guidelines, the listing of a subsidiary has shifted from a financing method that a listed company could choose at its own discretion to a matter falling within a regulatory framework where such listings are permitted only exceptionally, on the premise that procedures to protect the parent company’s general shareholders are carried out. When pursuing the listing of an affiliate within a corporate group, each listed company needs to check whether the dual-listing regulations apply to affiliates in a vertical control relationship with its consolidated subsidiaries, and also review whether (i) overseas listings, (ii) backdoor listings such as SPAC mergers, and (iii) ongoing M&A transactions fall within the scope of dual-listing. In particular, in corporate groups with multi-tiered control structures, particular care is warranted as both the holding company and the intermediate holding company may bear obligations as the parent company.

Therefore, if a subsidiary listing is planned, the subsidiary’s operational and managerial independence should be assessed from the initial stage of the process, and the governance structure should be proactively restructured. In addition, the board of directors and an independent special committee should be organized in compliance with the amended Commercial Code, such as by securing a pool of external expert candidates and establishing procedures for obtaining expert assistance at the company’s expense. Furthermore, it is necessary to establish an objective methodology for assessing the impact on shareholders and to design feasible shareholder-protection measures, such as cash dividends, cancellation of treasury shares and in-kind dividends of subsidiary shares. If the shareholder consent confirmation process is not conducted, then a rationale should be prepared in advance to address the case-by-case review, such as the need for large-scale fundraising and the low likelihood of harm to the rights and interests of general shareholders. In this process, the consistency with related disclosures, such as any corporate value enhancement plan, as well as objective supporting grounds for the deliberation and resolution process, should also be systematically put in place.

 

[Korean Version]

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