On May 21, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled in an en banc decision that for cases governed by the former Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (the Act before its amendment on September 9, 2025; hereinafter referred to as the “Former Trade Union Act”), “the scope of an employer bearing the duty to bargain collectively must be determined based on whether an explicit or implied contractual employment relationship exists.”
With the recent amendment to the Former Trade Union Act, a new provision was added to the latter part of Article 2, Subparagraph 2 (hereinafter the “Amended Trade Union Act” or “Yellow Envelope Act”), which expands employer status to those who, even if they are not a direct party to an employment contract, are in a position to substantially and specifically control or determine the working conditions of workers.
However, the Supreme Court maintained its existing precedent (the former legal doctrine) that for cases preceding the enforcement of the Amended Trade Union Act, a principal company’s status as an employer must be judged strictly on whether it is a party to an explicit or implied contractual employment relationship aiming to receive labor under its direction and supervision and to pay wages in return. Based on this doctrine, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim.
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1. |
Key Takeaways of the Supreme Court En Banc Decision |
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(1) |
Based on the text of Article 2, Subparagraph 2 of the Former Trade Union Act, it is difficult to interpret the concept of an “employer” to include those who, despite not being parties to an employment contract, are in a position to substantially and specifically control or determine the workers’ working conditions. |
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(2) |
The purpose of the recent amendment to the Act is to expand the definition of an employer more precisely since, in the case of unfair labor practices involving control or interference, an entity that is in a position to substantially and specifically control or determine the working conditions of the workers—even without having directly entered into an employment contract with them—can nonetheless infringe upon their three basic labor rights through factual acts of control or interference. |
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(3) |
Article 90 of the Former and Amended Trade Union Act imposes criminal penalties (imprisonment for up to 2 years or a criminal fine of up to KRW 20 million) on those who commit unfair labor practices. Since “being an employer who bears the duty to bargain collectively” is a core element of the criminal offense for refusing collective bargaining, Article 2 of the Former Trade Union Act must be strictly interpreted in accordance with the principle of legality. |
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(4) |
Looking at the substance and background of the Amended Trade Union Act, it is clear that the legislature made a deliberate choice to expand the concept of an “employer” by adding the latter part of Article 2, Subparagraph 2, on the premise of respecting the Supreme Court’s existing legal doctrine. |
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(5) |
The essence of adjudication lies in providing relief for rights in concrete cases; therefore, it is not permissible to declare abstract legal principles unrelated to a specific dispute. In a collective bargaining dispute arising around 2016 to which the Former Trade Union Act applies, it is inappropriate to depart from established precedent and apply a legal standard substantially similar to that of the Amended Trade Union Act. |
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Strategic Implications and Recommendations |




