1.

Gas Explosion at a Petrochemical Plant

The case involved a gas explosion and a fire at a petrochemical plant, killing one worker and injuring many other workers. In this case, the key issues were (i) whether the chief safety officer (“CSO”) could be deemed the RMP, and (ii) whether a failure to comply with the procedures for identifying and improving harmful and/or dangerous factors at the site could be deemed a violation of the SAPA.

The PO acknowledged that the representative director delegated to the CSO the overall and final decision-making authority regarding the company’s safety and health organization, personnel, budget, etc., and that the representative director did not exercise the final decision-making authority with respect to safety and health by, for example, giving instructions or engaging in safety and health matters, etc., of the company. In addition, with respect to the obligation to prepare procedures for identifying and improving harmful and/or dangerous factors under Article 4, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the SAPA and Article 4, Item 3 of the Enforcement Decree thereof, the PO determined that “risk assessment procedures” and “safety work approval procedures” existed, and it would be difficult to conclude that non-compliance with the procedures at the site indicated non-existence of procedures. Accordingly, the PO concluded that there was no violation of the obligation to prepare such procedures under the SAPA.

This case is significant in that (i) it is the first case, in which the investigative authority recognized a CSO as the RMP, and (ii) it was confirmed that a CSO can be deemed the RMP if it can be proven that the CSO has been practically granted, and has exercised, the overall and final decision-making authority regarding safety and health. In addition, because the “obligation to prepare procedures” under the SAPA and the “obligation to comply with such procedures” at the site should be distinguished from each other, this case shows that if the RMP faithfully performs his/her obligations to prepare procedures under the SAPA, it cannot be concluded that he/she breached his/her obligations under the SAPA.
 

2.

Caught-In-Between Accident During the Inspection of a Truck at a Car Manufacturer’s Plant

In this case, the truck’s cap fell during the inspection of a truck being manufactured at a car manufacturer’s plant, resulting in the death of a worker. The issues in this case were whether the RMP fulfilled his or her obligations under the SAPA and whether the worker performed the work in the ordinary manner.

The PO acknowledged that the accident was caused by the worker’s unusual work activity. The PO also determined that it would be difficult to conclude that (i) the RMP was required to establish procedures to identify and improve harmful and/or dangerous factors of an unusual work activity, or (ii) the RMP willfully violated such duty (if any duty were found to exist). Accordingly, the PO concluded that there was no violation of the SAPA.

This case is meaningful because it revealed the difficulty of determining the RMP’s intent to violate the duty under the SAPA, when an industrial accident occurs as a result of a worker’s unusual behavior. This case is similar to court precedents and other instances where the investigative authority did not indict individuals responsible for accidents caused by unconventional work methods because it was deemed challenging to conclude that company owners had the intent to violate the Occupational Safety and Health Act.
 

3.

Caught-In-Between Accident While Repairing a Crane at a Steelmaking Company

This case involved a worker who died while repairing a steelmaker’s crane. The issue in this case was whether the RMP of the company properly established risk assessment procedures (as procedures for identifying and improving harmful and/or dangerous factors stipulated under Article 4, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the SAPA and Article 4, Item 3 of the Enforcement Decree of the SAPA).

The PO found that (i) the company’s risk assessment procedures were consistent with the “Guidelines on Workplace Risk Assessment” issued by the Ministry of Employment and Labor, (ii) the company conducted regular and non-periodic risk assessments in the presence of workers, and (iii) risk assessment procedures for assessing risks involved with the company’s subcontractors were also in place. Therefore, the PO determined that there was no violation of the SAPA.

This case is important in that with respect to the obligation to prepare procedures for identifying and improving harmful and/or dangerous factors (the obligation that has become the most contested issue in SAPA violation cases), it was made clear that risk assessment procedures have to be established at a certain level so as not to be found in violation of the SAPA.
 

4.

Explosion of a Heat Exchanger at a Petrochemical Plant

The case involved the explosion of a heat exchanger at a petrochemical plant during airtight testing after cleaning the heat exchanger, killing four workers and injuring many others. The accident occurred immediately after the enforcement of the SAPA, and whether the company’s RMP properly fulfilled the obligation to ensure safety and health under the SAPA was the main issue.

The PO found that (i) the goals and management policies for safety and health (Article 4, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the SAPA and Article 4, Item 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the SAPA) established by the company’s RMP were abstract and general, and thus could not be deemed to be in line with the intent of the SAPA, but (ii) other obligations to ensure safety and health (Article 4, Paragraph 1, Items 1 and 4 of the SAPA and Article 4, Items 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 9 of the Enforcement Decree of the SAPA) had been fulfilled, and (iii) it would be difficult to find any causal relationship between the violation of the obligation to establish safety and health goals (as well as management policies) and the occurrence of the accident. As a result, the PO determined that there was no violation of the SAPA.

In this case, the cause of the accident was somewhat unclear, and therefore the exact cause of the accident was one of the issues at hand. In particular, technical and sophisticated analysis as well as proof of defects in some components of the heat exchanger that caused the explosion (and the reason for such defects in the components) were crucial. An opinion on the root cause analysis served as a key basis for the decision in this case.

This is a case that gives an overall guidance on the extent to which the obligation to ensure safety and health under the SAPA should be fulfilled in order for the RMP to not be deemed in violation of the SAPA. Furthermore, this case is noteworthy as it considered whether causation between a breach of the obligation and the occurrence of an accident could be proven. In other words, the PO reviewed, in detail, the elements to be satisfied for finding a violation of the SAPA.