On October 16, 2025, the Supreme Court held that a company’s transfer of shares that it holds in a subsidiary that carries out the company’s core business constitutes a transfer of a material business that requires the approval by a special resolution at the general meeting of shareholders. The Supreme Court further held that where a company unlawfully rejects a minority shareholders’ proposal to include into the agenda of the general meeting of shareholders the ratification of such transfer, the company and its representative director may be liable for that rejection, and the resulting damages would be equal to the purchase price that would have been payable under the dissenting shareholders’ appraisal rights (Supreme Court Decision No. 2019Da236385 rendered on October 16, 2025; the “Decision”).
Whether a transaction constitutes the transfer of a “material business” requiring approval by a special resolution at the general meeting of shareholders has long been a contentious issue in M&A practice and corporate governance, particularly where the transaction involves the transfer of shares in a subsidiary as opposed to the transfer of a business operation (e.g., the transfer of the business’ assets, liabilities, contracts, officers and employees). While the Supreme Court has consistently held that any disposal of business assets having the same effect as transferring or discontinuing all or part of a company’s business constitutes a transfer under Article 374(1)1 of the Korean Commercial Code (the “KCC”) and therefore requires the approval by a special resolution at a general meeting of shareholders (Supreme Court Decision No. 2004Da13717 rendered on July 8, 2004, etc.), the Supreme Court has now further clarified that a disposition of shares it holds that, even in the case of subsidiary shares, if, as a result of their disposition, of the company’s sales, performance and business relationships arising from the relevant business are extinguished, such disposition also constitutes a transfer of material business, thereby requiring a special resolution of the general meeting of shareholders under Article 374 of the KCC. As a result, such transactions may also require compliance with the procedures for the exercise of appraisal rights by dissenting shareholders under Article 374-2 of the KCC.
The Supreme Court also held that minority shareholders may submit shareholder proposals to include items on the agenda of a general meeting of shareholders for the purposes of exercising appraisal rights as dissenting shareholders, and where the company unlawfully rejects such shareholder proposal, the company and its representative director may be directly liable for the resulting damages to individual shareholders. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court did not rely on Article 401 of the KCC (which governs the liability of directors to third parties), but instead referred to the provisions governing the joint liability of a company and its representative director under Articles 389(3) and 210 of the KCC.
The Decision warrants heightened attention in both M&A transactions and the operation of general meetings of shareholders, as it confirms that, where materiality thresholds are met, a transfer of shares in a subsidiary may trigger both: (i) a special resolution requirement applicable to transfer of material businesses and (ii) dissenting shareholders’ appraisal rights. The Supreme Court further held that the representative director, in his personal capacity, was directly liable (together with the company) for unlawfully rejecting a shareholder proposal submitted by minority shareholders, and articulated the legal principles for calculating the resulting damages. In this regard, the Decision has significant implications for the duty of directors to protect shareholder interests under Article 382-3 of the amended KCC, as well as the recognition of directors’ direct liability to shareholders.
Below are the details of the Decision. We will continue to keep you informed of any subsequent legislative developments and court decisions relating to corporate governance.
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1. |
Case Overview |
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2. |
Lower Court’s Decision |
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(1) |
because Company A discontinued its cycling shoe manufacturing business as a result of the transfer of the subsidiary shares, the share transfer agreement with respect to such subsidiary shares constitutes a transfer of business (or business assets) requiring an approval by special resolution at the general meeting of shareholders; |
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(2) |
Company A’s refusal to accept the plaintiffs’ shareholder proposal was unlawful, as the proposal cannot be characterized as either (a) a matter that cannot be realized by the company or (b) a mere grievance of individual shareholders; |
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(3) |
if such special resolution ratifying the share transfer agreement were to be approved, the plaintiffs would have had specific and legally protected expectations to receive compensation through the appraisal rights prescribed by Article 374-2 of the KCC, and Company A’s failure to carry out the requisite resolution procedure infringed those expectations; and |
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(4) |
Company A, its representative director and its directors, by intentionally or negligently breaching their duty to carry out the requisite resolution procedures or their fiduciary duties, caused damage to the plaintiffs. |
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Supreme Court’s Decision |
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(1) |
Shareholders cannot directly participate in the day-to-day management of company and may influence the company’s affairs only through indirect means, such as through resolutions at a general meeting of shareholders (Supreme Court Decision No. 2000Ma7839 rendered on February 28, 2001; Supreme Court Decision Nos. 2018Da228462 and 2018Da228479 rendered on June 9, 2022; etc.). As a result, shareholders are not permitted to intervene directly in transactions between Company A and its subsidiaries to seek judicial declaration of the invalidity of the transfer of subsidiary shares or demand that the subsidiaries perform their obligation restitution and return such transferred subsidiary shares to Company A. Accordingly, the plaintiffs had no other choice but to submit a shareholder proposal requesting that the ratification of the share transfer agreement be included as an agenda item at the general meeting of shareholders. |
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(2) |
Even if the actual purpose of the shareholder proposal was for the plaintiffs to oppose the proposed agenda item and thereby exercise appraisal rights, the shareholder proposal cannot be regarded as (i) “a grievance of an individual shareholder” under Article 12, Item 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the KCC, (ii) “a matter that cannot be realized by the company” under Item 5 of the same Article, or (iii) “a violation of laws, regulations, or the articles of incorporation” under Article 363-2(3) of the KCC. Nevertheless, the representative director and directors of Company A took no steps to rectify the previously void transfer of subsidiary shares (such as adopting a board resolution to include the ratification of the void share purchase agreement as an agenda item of the general meeting of shareholders), thereby rejecting the plaintiffs’ shareholder proposal without justifiable grounds. |
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(3) |
The representative director and directors of Company A, by intentionally or negligently breaching their duties as directors, unlawfully rejected the plaintiffs’ shareholder proposal and failed to take the steps necessary to bring the proposal to ratify the share transfer agreement before the general meeting of shareholders. As a result, the plaintiffs were deprived of the opportunity to exercise their appraisal rights as dissenting shareholders (which they would have been able to exercise had such shareholder proposal been approved), and they suffered losses equal to the amount they would have received as the share purchase price. Accordingly, the representative director and the directors of Company are jointly liable to compensate the plaintiffs for such losses, and Company A is also liable (jointly with its representative director) for the plaintiffs’ losses resulting from its representative director’s unlawful performance of its duties, pursuant to Articles 389 and 210 of the KCC. |
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(4) |
The damages suffered by the plaintiffs are the amount equal to the share purchase price plaintiffs would have received as of the date of Company A’s ordinary general meeting of shareholders, and statutory default interest accrued on that amount at the annual rate of 5%, as provided under the Civil Act, from the day following the general meeting of shareholders. |




